Standing Committee B

[Mr. Roger Gale in the Chair]

Proceeds of Crime Bill

Roger Gale: Good afternoon. It might be helpful if I remind the Committee that, in accordance with the amendment to the programme order agreed this morning, all questions necessary to dispose of proceedings on part 8 of the Bill will be put at 6 o'clock this evening, and all questions necessary to dispose of proceedings on part 9 of the Bill will be put before half-past 7 this evening. I say before, rather than at, half-past 7, because this Chairman does not sit past 7 o'clock without a break. I am prepared to suspend the sitting at 7 o'clock and sit again at half-past 8, but I am not prepared to have the staff of the House kept sitting for more than two and a half hours in one go. I tell you that now in order to concentrate minds.Clause 346 Disclosure orders

Clause 346 - Disclosure orders

Amendment proposed [this day]: No. 556, in page 200, line 38, at end insert— 
'or a civil recovery investigation'.—[Mr. Grieve.]
 Question again proposed, That the amendment be made.

Roger Gale: I remind the Committee that with this we are taking amendment No. 557, in page 200, line 42, leave out from 'investigation' to the end of line 3 on page 201.

Dominic Grieve: When I was cut off at 1 o'clock, I was about to withdraw my amendment. As I was not able to do it then, I now beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn.

Dominic Grieve: I beg to move amendment No. 558, in page 201, line 8, leave out 'or at once'.
 The amendment, which, like the previous group, relates to disclosure orders, would affect subsection (4), which says: 
A disclosure order is an order authorising the Director to give to any person the Director considers has relevant information notice in writing requiring him to do, with respect to any matter relevant to the investigation for the purposes of which the order is sought, any or all of the following—
(a) answer questions, either at a time specified in the notice or at once, at a place so specified.
 The Minister will see that my amendment would delete the words ''or at once''. [Interruption.] I am glad that the Minister can confirm that. As with so many things, I was trying to put my amendment in context. 
 I wonder whether those words are not a little over the top. I should be grateful to learn why it is felt necessary to include them, especially as there is a right of appeal to the court. It is difficult for someone to use 
 that if he is told that if he does not do something at once, he is guilty of a criminal offence.

Norman Baker: Will the hon. Gentleman reflect on the fact that although it may be difficult to answer questions ''at once'', as it says in subsection (4)(a), it is even more difficult to produce documents ''at once'', as subsection (4)(c) demands?

Dominic Grieve: The hon. Gentleman makes a good point. I decided to highlight the first use of the phrase so that we could discuss the subject, as has been my practice in the past in Committee. Will the Minister explain why that phrase is needed? He could also say whether there is an origin for that power, or whether the words ''at once'' are novel among such orders. That would help the Committee to consider whether there is a precedent. I am fully aware of how useful disclosure orders can be, but I find it difficult to find a justification for saying, ''Answer this now.'' I would normally expect someone at least to have the opportunity of getting legal advice, which often rapidly leads to responses to previously unanswered questions.

Bob Ainsworth: We have been in Committee for a few months, and we have got to know each other so well that I am not the slightest bit surprised that the hon. Gentleman expects us to object to someone doing anything at once—or quickly, or forthwith, or now. To do something at once is more than we might expect from the hon. Gentleman's character, as he has shown so well in Committee.
 The amendment would mean that the director of the agency would not be able to conduct an interview with an individual under the disclosure order with immediate effect. He would have to arrange for the interview to be held at some stage in the future. The disclosure order power is modelled closely on the power under the Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order 1996. That allows the power to be exercised by notice in writing and specifies where, and at what time, the interview is to take place, which may be immediately. 
 If the director considers that the person whom he wishes to interview already has the knowledge to answer the questions, there is no need for delay. A member of the agency, armed with the authorised notice under the clause, could visit a person who is considered to have relevant information and compel him to answer questions there and then. 
 The hon. Member for Beaconsfield (Mr. Grieve) referred to a person's rights. There is certainly a right to be legally represented, and that could be seen as clashing with the requirement to deal with the matter immediately. I have asked my officials to check with their colleagues in the Northern Ireland Office on how the provision operates in the Province. 
 Paragraph 8 of schedule 2 of the Proceeds of Crime (Northern Ireland) Order enables the Secretary of State to draw up a code of practice in connection with the exercise of financial investigations under the powers conferred by that schedule. The code provides information about the operation of a disclosure order in Northern Ireland, and says that a 
 person should be interviewed in private, and should be permitted to be legally represented, if he asks. The wording in the Bill differs from the code, but there is no difference in substance. We do not believe that there is a substantive difference between ''forthwith'' and ''at once''. 
 When it is believed that a person has information already in his possession, he should be required to render it. He has the right to be legally represented, and that cannot be cut across by such a requirement.

Paul Stinchcombe: I seek the Minister's assistance. Under the Bill, it would have to be known where the person would be when he was confronted with the order, so that he could answer the questions
either at a time specified in the notice or at once, at a place so specified.
 Difficulties could arise if no one knew where the person might be, or if he had moved location by the time that he was contacted. How will that be dealt with in practice? Will it be possible for a notice to be drafted in the alternative?

Bob Ainsworth: Yes, and I think that the clause provides for a specified time. If it were not known where the person was and whether he had the information to hand, it would be appropriate to specify a time when the information was required. I am talking about someone whose whereabouts are known, and it is felt that he has the information and there is no reasonable excuse for his withholding it. Notwithstanding the fact that a person has a right to legal representation, the director has the power under the Bill to insist on the information being rendered immediately. Different circumstances will lead to different requirements under the order.

Norman Baker: I wish to be clear about the legal representation. Can people access legal advice before being required to answer questions ''at once'', or are they expected to answer questions at once and then seek legal advice?

Bob Ainsworth: I am told that the provision operates without difficulty in Northern Ireland. It is governed by a code, in which such issues have to be covered. The requirement to answer questions immediately cannot cut across the right to legal representation, and it does not do so.

Dominic Grieve: This has been an interesting discussion, especially now I realise that the provision has a Northern Ireland derivation. Northern Ireland is perhaps not the best place to go to find well drafted legislation, usually because legislation has been drafted on the basis of wanting to suppress terrorism, which is understandable, but sometimes leads to infelicities of wording.
 As the Minister says, ''at once'' does not actually mean at once. The rules would be drafted so as to allow people the necessary time, which is exactly what I expected the Minister to say—so I wonder whether the phrase ''at once'' is necessary at all. As the Minister suggested that he would consult his officials, I 
 am not minded to press the amendment to a Division, but I hope that in doing so he will find out whether happier drafting might be arrived at, which would provide all the powers that he wants without including rather stentorian commands that the provision does not really mean. Once that drafting is in the statute, at some point someone will say, ''Either you answer this moment, immediately, or you are for the high jump.'' That is simply undesirable.

Bob Ainsworth: Is the hon. Gentleman really arguing that in no circumstances should there be a requirement for an immediate answer? That is effectively what he is saying. In some circumstances—plucking them out of the air is rather difficult—with meetings due to take place and legal representatives present, when information was felt to be in the person's knowledge, the director would not be able to require its disclosure until a later date. That is a recipe for allowing people to hide the information required, and thus to avoid the powers in the Bill.

Dominic Grieve: If an arrangement has been arrived at whereby someone has been asked to attend at a police station, that person is unlikely to be under arrest. Indeed, it is likely that the person involved would be not the principal target of the civil recovery or confiscation procedures, but merely someone who was, or was believed to be, connected, and who might be able to provide useful information. The mere fact that he has been invited to attend is, I should have thought, likely to put him on notice about the nature of the questions that he will be asked. If he has been lulled or lured into a police station or another place under false pretences, it would be unfair for someone to turn up and say, ''Oh goody—you've got your solicitor here, so you've got all you need. Here's a notice: start answering our questions now on this topic.'' I would still expect a period to be provided, even if it were short—say, 30 minutes—before that person legally had to provide those answers. The use of the phrase ''at once'' therefore strikes me as odd.
 I do not know what is intended. I would have expected the notice to contain words to the effect of, ''Notice is served on you that at 6 pm tomorrow you will have to answer questions.'' I have no problem with that. Perhaps the wording is intended to mean, ''At 6 pm tomorrow, or as soon as we can lay our hands on you.'' I do not think that that is what the Minister intends, which is why I say that in view of the regulations that he wants to draw up, the words ''at once'' are, to use an old lawyers' word, otiose. If the words are not otiose, and it is true that the Minister intends to confront individuals and say, ''In this particular circumstance, we will not give you the option of a time or any notice, and you will answer the questions now,'' that is wrong. I hope that he will reconsider the matter.

Bob Ainsworth: As I said, a code of practice currently operates in Northern Ireland. In all probability, we will require that to be used here, to dictate how the director performs his business. I will consider the points that the hon. Gentleman thinks must be covered by the code.

Dominic Grieve: What I have said applies with equal force to the production of documents, although in a funny way, I am less worried about that. I am worried about putting a person on the spot and requiring them to answer questions without the prior chance to get legal advice and take preliminary steps. The words ''at once'' imply that that would happen, yet the Minister has conceded that it is not expected to happen. It would be wise to bring the reality of what is intended and the words in the Bill together.

Vera Baird: I wonder whether there is an answer to the hon. Gentleman's earlier point about the interplay between the requirement for a disclosure at once, and the right of appeal. What would happen if the legal adviser arrived and advised that the document was not proper and should be appealed?

Dominic Grieve: I agree with the hon. Lady. As there is a requirement, the offence would be committed immediately. That is extremely undesirable. This situation has not been focused on, and I wonder whether it was focused on in the Northern Ireland legislation.
 I am tempted to press the amendment to a vote, but for once, I am prepared to give the Minister the benefit of the doubt. However, I would like a reply that sets out the full position before Report, because I shall undoubtedly return to it then, time permitting—heaven knows, we are going to be pretty pressed for time on Report, depending on how many days the Government allocate. 
 I do not have all the facts. The Minister may have facts with which he can persuade me so, unusually, I shall not press the amendment. However, there is an important issue here, because apart from anything else, magic words appear on the front of the Bill about conformity with the European convention on human rights. I cannot help thinking that this little bit of the Bill may not conform. Even if we retain the provision, it might not be to the Government's advantage. Northern Ireland legislation is riddled with examples of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the convention being gently sidelined.

Bob Ainsworth: I do not disagree with the hon. Gentleman, in that we must ensure that we understand exactly how the wording in the clause fits in with a required code of conduct and an individual's rights. That must be explained to the hon. Gentleman and other members of the Committee, and we will try to do that.

Dominic Grieve: I am grateful to the Minister. In the spirit of general conciliation, I beg to ask leave to withdraw the amendment.
 Amendment, by leave, withdrawn. 
 Clause 346 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 347 - Requirements for making of disclosure order

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 552, in page 201, line 30, at end add—
'(4) In deciding whether information which may be provided is of substantial value, the court must be satisfied that the information is directly connected to determining whether someone is in possession 
of recoverable property and to any offence through which that property was obtained.'.
 You were not here this morning, Mr. Gale, when we had a discussion about the relationship between the Bill and the Human Rights Act 1998. I fear that I may have to refer to that in passing, because I am worried about the clause's compatibility with the terms of that Act. 
 This morning, the hon. Member for Beaconsfield moved an amendment because he was worried that disclosure orders should not apply in cases of civil recovery investigations. The amendment was not incorporated in the Bill, although I cannot remember whether it was put to a vote. The Minister replied that the provision had to be in the Bill, and that if it were removed, that would leave a big hole. He said that such matters would be best addressed by considering the safeguards—or lack of them—in clause 347. 
 That brings me to amendment No. 552. I wish to remind the Committee that both the Minister and the explanatory notes concede that disclosure orders are ''intrusive''. It appears that the Government are concerned that the power should be exercised sparingly, and with proper attention to safeguards. The purpose of the amendment is to strengthen those safeguards. 
 I have mentioned the human rights legislation, and I want the Minister to place on the record his view about the compatibility of the clause, as it is currently drafted, with, in particular, a person's rights under article 8 and article 6.2 of the convention—not least because clause 348 makes failure to provide information to the state into a criminal offence. 
 I accept that such requirements are not brand new. Disclosure orders can be issued in company and financial investigations, and that is considered acceptable. However, that is a narrow and specific investigative field, in which such orders are justified on the basis of proportionality, particularly in the light of the need to regulate financial services—a subject that will interest the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok (Mr. Davidson). 
 There is a difference between that narrow application and the much wider application that subsection (3) would permit if the amendment were not accepted. The application of that power might be justifiable with regard to, for example, a requirement in company and financial law to deal with the detection of corporate offences, and to the position of a person who might be involved in that, such as a company director. However, under the clause—especially the requirement under subsection (2)(b)—the power could have a very wide application that would cover an almost limitless number of offences, including potentially trivial matters. Therefore, the potential scope for abuse of the provision is significant. That represents a real danger. It is important to remind the Committee that, as the Government admit, the clause introduces intrusive powers. 
 I presume that the Minister will refer to subsection (3), which states: 
There must be reasonable grounds for believing that information which may be provided in compliance with a requirement imposed under the order is likely to be of substantial value.
 Although I welcome that safeguard, it focuses on the order's value to an investigation. A disclosure order should also be shown to have a rationale, or connection, with regard to its aims, so it should focus on the property.

Paul Stinchcombe: Does the hon. Gentleman not feel that the clause already contains the focus for which he is arguing? It requires that information required under the order
is likely to be of substantial value . . . to the investigation for the purposes of which the order is sought.

Norman Baker: I agree that the words
for the purposes of which the order is sought
 are helpful. 
 The hon. Gentleman appears to be implying that my amendment is unnecessary. If that is the case, he will have no objection to the words that I have added. As the Minister and the Government accept that the clause introduces an intrusive power, it would be prudent to adopt the belt-and-braces approach that the amendment proposes. 
 Amendment No. 552 would add a new subsection (4), which would state: 
In deciding whether information which may be provided is of substantial value, the court must be satisfied that the information is directly connected to determining whether someone is in possession of recoverable property and to any offence through which that property was obtained.
 Under the clause, disclosure orders could be used to obtain general background information about the movements and activities of suspected persons or suspected property, but that is not a sufficient reason to justify an intrusive clause. Other powers are open to the Government if they wish to secure information about suspected persons or suspected property movement. They have powers under the Police Act 1997 and under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, and in some ways those tests are harder. If the Government want to go beyond the narrow issue that links a person with property, the test should be harder. The test is in law already, and the Government can avail themselves of such powers under the two Acts that I have mentioned. That is a more appropriate way forward, and I hope that the Minister will have some sympathy with my argument.

Nick Hawkins: It is not often, even in this Committee, that a Conservative Member—particularly one on the Front bench—supports a Liberal Democrat amendment. I now find myself in that position—with one slight refinement. I would have been happier if the amendment moved by the hon. Member for Lewes (Norman Baker) had said that the court must be ''satisfied, so that it is sure''. In recent years, that has been the usual replacement in English law for ''beyond reasonable doubt''.
 Would the hon. Gentleman have been happy if my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I had added ''satisfied, so that it is sure''? [Interruption]—I 
 see that he is helpfully agreeing. I am grateful for that, because it confirms the decision made by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and myself. We did not think that it was worth while proposing a further amendment simply to add those words, because we believed that the issues would be sufficiently debated when discussing the amendment that the hon. Member for Lewes and his colleagues had tabled. I strongly believe that those words would add a further safeguard, and I agree with what the hon. Gentleman said. 
 We need to see that the information is directly connected to determining whether a person is in possession of recoverable property and if he is linked to any offence through which that property was obtained. Even the zealots on the Government Back Benches—led, as always, by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok—will realise that the amendment is not an attempt by the Liberal Democrats to water down the Bill. It is not only a helpful safeguard, but a useful clarification. I hope that the Minister will accept the amendment, even if he does not agree completely with the suggested words. He may even prefer my refinement of them—but perhaps that is too much to hope for. 
 Ministers have been very helpful today, and have already accepted another Grieve/Hawkins amendment. Perhaps the Government will also say that, on reflection, Opposition members of the Committee—whether Liberal Democrat or Conservative—have a good point. I certainly hope so. I will listen with interest to what the Minister says. The hon. Member for Lewes may be right to predict that the Minister will talk about the other subsections that would appear before suggested new subsection (4), but on this occasion, I strongly support the thrust of the hon. Gentleman's amendment.

Bob Ainsworth: The amendment would require that the court be satisfied that the order is likely to be of substantive value to the investigation. The thrust of the Opposition amendment is to qualify that, and, in effect, to forge a stronger link between the investigation and the property or the underlying offence. A disclosure order is a significant power, designed to assist the director in his investigations. For example, the subject of a civil recovery investigation may have gone to great lengths to try to put property that is—or represents—the proceeds of unlawful conduct beyond the reach of the director. I have had the impression when we have been discussing the powers under part 8 we seem to have forgotten, or to be prepared to forget, some of our earlier debates on civil recovery, and the extreme ingenuity that is used to hide the proceeds of crime and render them incapable of recovery. I ask Opposition Members to bear that in mind when they constantly try to rein in the ability of the investigatory powers to recover those proceeds.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister, who is being fair in his approach to the issues, should recognise that without undermining the spirit of the Bill, there is a legitimate reason why we should debate the question of what reins should be attached to any investigatory body. When we are extending powers, it is Parliament's job
 to ask how far the new powers should go. Again, I see the hon. Member for Lewes nodding in support of my comments.

Bob Ainsworth: I have had that lecture from the hon. Gentleman, his colleagues and the hon. Member for Lewes on more than a few occasions, and each time I have retorted that I accept that completely. However, I hope that there is an equal realisation that we do not sit here to waste our time and pass legislation that only looks good on paper, and simply gives everyone the nice warm feeling that we are doing something about the issues that inflict such damage on our communities.
 As we go through the winter spending hours on the Bill, we should be trying to make law enforcement much more effective than it has been to date. I remind the hon. Gentleman that it is perfectly justifiable to say that such enforcement has not been very effective in recovering the proceeds of crime, compared with the powers that other countries have taken and used to make a considerable dent in the profitability of criminal activity there. We should bear both sides in mind when we discuss the issues. No one wants to take powers that are not proportionate to the problem, but we are not here to waste our time.

Annette Brooke: I ask this question in genuine innocence. In what way does the Minister suggest that the amendment would weaken the legislation? His reasons are not coming out clearly. I can see some arguments for it, and despite his robust response, the Minister has not told us why the amendment would weaken the Bill.

Bob Ainsworth: I am happy to do that, and will move on to it, but when I am repeatedly told how draconian, awful and utterly uncalled for the legislation is, Members should expect some retort, and some justification of what lies behind the Bill.

David Wilshire: We seem to have reverted to earlier attitudes, which I find unfortunate. There is no disagreement between the Minister and the Opposition that we must do something. However, when he tries to say that just because we must do something, what the Government suggest is the only thing that we can do, that is when we part company. Does he accept that we do not deny that we must do something, simply because we disagree with what he is trying to do?

Bob Ainsworth: No, I do not want to say that at all. If the hon. Gentleman introduced proposals that would make the legislation even more workable and effective, I would be happy to hear about them.

Ian Davidson: Does the Minister agree that if the Opposition parties continually table amendments that would weaken the legislation, we are entitled to assume that they want to weaken the legislation? If they want to make it work better by introducing proposals that would make the Bill tougher, more precise or more exact, we would examine them in that spirit, but the fact that they are always producing weakening amendments leads us to believe that they are yet again on the side of the collaborators rather than the innocents.

Bob Ainsworth: I was trying to make part of that point in my response to the hon. Member for Spelthorne, although my hon. Friend makes it in his own way, and perhaps goes a little further than I would; that is in line with the constant allegation that I am a big Mr. Softy.

Nick Hawkins: The Minister will accept that we are entitled to raise our queries and he is entitled, as he puts it, to retort. Usually the battle is between the Minister, my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and me, and it would be difficult to imagine a more moderate and reasonable way than the one in which the hon. Member for Lewes moved the amendment, as Hansard will show. He did not accuse the Minister of being draconian or anything else, which is an allegation that Opposition Members have sometimes made with regard to other issues. He moved the amendment in a moderate and reasonable way, as I hope I did when I supported him.

Bob Ainsworth: As ever, yet another amendment—

Ian Davidson: Will the Minister give way?

Bob Ainsworth: If my hon. Friend will forgive me, let us move on, as we are making no headway on the issue, and I am still trying to answer the question asked by the hon. Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole (Mrs. Brooke).
 Information that is obtained through a disclosure order will greatly assist the director to determine whether particular property may be recoverable. It may also help the director to establish the good arguable case that he requires for an interim receivership order, and the stronger case that is needed to achieve success at the substantive civil recovery hearing. The disclosure order will require a person to provide information relevant to the investigation for which the order is sought. The information sought must be of substantive value to the investigation. 
 Some information may not be directly connected to determining whether the property concerned is recoverable, but it is still relevant and of substantive value. For example, an order may be requested in relation to a person's financial affairs, which may have a bearing on the provenance of recoverable property. Such information would not necessarily be directly connected with the property itself, but could still be of substantive value to the investigation. It is self-evident that the order is intrusive. There is no need for any great confession; we do not deny that in any way. Anyone who considers the power accepts that it is intrusive. For that reason, the Bill contains several conditions that relate to the application of the disclosure order, which will ensure that it is used appropriately and proportionately.

Norman Baker: I am glad that the Minister accepts that the order is intrusive, which is the word used in the explanatory notes. However, does he accept that under clause 347(2)(b), many people of many different types, who may be completely unconnected with any criminal activities, may be caught and required to provide information?

Bob Ainsworth: Yes, but let us consider how the powers will be used and the justification that will be needed in the first place. Under subsection (2), which relates to confiscation investigations,
There must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that . . . the person specified in the application for the order has benefited from his criminal conduct.
 For the civil recovery investigation, 
There must be reasonable grounds for suspecting that . . . the property specified in the application for the order is recoverable property or associated property.
 Those provisos are already included in part 2 and part 5. 
 Under subsection (3), there is a requirement that 
There must be reasonable grounds for believing that information . . . is likely to be of substantial value . . . to the investigation.
 The further safeguard is that the Human Rights Act 1998 requires a judge not to act in a way that is incompatible with convention rights. For example, the director will have to satisfy the judge that an infringement of a person's right to privacy under article 8 of the convention is proportionate to the benefit to be gained from making the order. 
 In civil recovery investigations, the information sought by the director through a disclosure order is likely to be connected to determining whether the property held by someone is recoverable. That is the basic purpose of the civil recovery investigation. It may also relate to information about unlawful conduct through which the property was obtained. However, the information may not relate to both issues, as the amendment would require. 
 When the recoverable property represents the original property, it may be several stages removed from the unlawful conduct through which the property was originally obtained. Intricate measures may have been taken to conceal the origins of the property. In such cases, it is unlikely that the order would reveal information connected to the unlawful conduct itself. None the less, it may provide information of substantial value that related to whether the property was recoverable, or, indeed, whether it was associated property. The amendment would mean that the director would not be able to apply for a disclosure order in such cases. 
 The amendment refers to information directly connected to an offence through which recoverable property was obtained. That could be taken to imply that there must be a link between the recoverable property and a specific offence. As we said when discussing part 5, that will not often be the case. Disclosure orders used by the director will not be used in run-of-the-mill confiscation cases. They will be used in complex cases that are taken on by the director and involve confiscation or civil recovery. 
 As I said earlier, I am talking not about thousands of such cases, but an agency that is targeting particular areas where it feels that it can bring a difficult-to-mount civil recovery case. We shall not be dealing with simple cases in which it would be dead easy to tie back the property to the original offence. The property obtained through unlawful conduct should not have to be linked to a specific offence. It is not necessary to 
 show that the property was obtained through a particular kind of unlawful conduct, so long as it can be shown to have been obtained through unlawful conduct of one kind or another.

Nick Hawkins: I accept that the Minister's explanation is helpful. He said that the measure would be used only in the most complex cases. Even though Ministers give certain assurances and say that that is how matters will normally proceed and that guidance will be available to ensure that that is so, we must be careful that the wording in the Bill that could apply more widely is absolutely right and goes only so far as is proportionate. That is my argument, and that of the hon. Member for Lewes. It is easy to say that the provision will be used only in such cases, but there would be no restriction under the Bill unless the amendment were accepted.

Bob Ainsworth: The restriction under the Bill is the fact that the disclosure orders must be first approved by the judicial authority. As the hon. Gentleman probably knows better than me, the argument about the European convention on human rights concerns proportionality. The justification for the issuing of the order meets his point. That is not missing from the Bill.
 The amendment as drafted would apply to both civil recovery and confiscation investigations. It would mean that a disclosure order could not be made in a confiscation investigation, since the concept of ''recoverable property'' applies only to part 5. We believe that the provisions ensure that the disclosure order will be made only when appropriate and proportionate. The amendment would reduce the effectiveness of the order and the director's ability to obtain the information that he needs. I ask the hon. Gentleman to withdraw his amendment.

Mark Field: I shall be brief, as we have discussed the clause in some detail. There is no doubt that disclosure orders are intrusive, and Opposition Members have reiterated their strong concerns on the subject. I instinctively feel great concern about the idea of the large-scale use of disclosure orders on innocent people. People may subsequently prove to be guilty of all sorts of crimes, but it is only with strong safeguards that the court should be able to impose on the accused the duty to disclose their financial affairs and details of their property.
 The three subsections of clause 347 offer the scope, at least, for a fishing expedition. I appreciate that, as the Minister says, in general there is little doubt that a British court would take an appropriate and proportionate approach, but that is why the hon. Member for Lewes wanted to insert a new subsection. It is easy to trust the courts, and in the great majority of cases there would be no issue at stake. However, if we are simply to rely on the wording, that is all the more reason to firm it up as proposed. 
 I would feel more comfortable if the court had to 
be satisfied that the information is directly connected to determining whether someone is in possession of recoverable property and to any offence through which that property was obtained.
 That would provide a sort of safeguard, but would not water the provisions down or make the process more difficult. Above all, the safeguard would mean that there would be no room for lawyers to make a big argument based on the European convention on human rights if there were some sort of dispute. 
 As the Minister has rightly said, it is important that a disclosure order is made only when it is relevant and of substantive value, but the important question is, to which investigation should it be made? My grave concern is that the provision could be used as a fishing expedition not only for the investigation in hand, but for future investigations involving people who may be subject to other charges in future. For that reason, Opposition Members would feel more comfortable with the idea proposed in the amendment. I am a little sorry that the Minister does not see some merit in the arguments made by my hon. Friend the Member for Surrey Heath (Mr. Hawkins) and the hon. Member for Lewes, who moved the amendment.

Ian Davidson: I speak as a critical friend of the Minister. I would like to respond to points made earlier by the hon. Member for Surrey Heath, whom I hope to see at 9 pm at the annual general meeting and at 9.30 for training in the bar.

Nick Hawkins: May I say—without infringing on your patience, I hope, Mr. Gale—that I have already made it known that I propose to be in Room 19 at 9 o'clock to propose the hon. Gentleman's re-election as captain of the Lords and Commons rugby club? He has my word on that.

Ian Davidson: I am grateful for that. I understand that the hon. Gentleman might bring the hon. Member for Henley (Mr. Johnson) with him, and I look forward to hearing about his Ugandan adventures.

Roger Gale: Order. I am not sure what disclosures are likely to take place in Room 19—indeed, I shudder to think what they may be—but I am certain that they have nothing to do with the subject under discussion.

Ian Davidson: The way to find out about the disclosures is to be there at 9 o'clock.
 The hon. Member for Surrey Heath confused style and substance. The Liberals' proposal was made in a cuddly, innocuous, soft-centred and liberalish way, but that does not mean that its effect would not be malignant. Again, I notice that only two of the three Liberals on the Committee are here. That makes me sorry that they did not give one of their places to the Scottish National party, which is regrettably absent from these discussions. 
 The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mr. Field) regrets the fact that disclosure orders are intrusive—but they are designed to be so. That is the point of the orders. Frankly, I favour fishing expeditions. If there were more of them, more of the guilty would be caught, and more of my constituents whose lives are poisoned by drugs and drug dealers would stay alive.

David Wilshire: The hon. Gentleman is going back over old territory, so perhaps he should be asked to go back over the riposte that is bound to follow. Does he
 not agree that fishing expeditions would also infringe the rights of the innocent?

Ian Davidson: In some circumstances they might, but that takes us back to the question of a balance. I am prepared for a large number of people to be inconvenienced if that is necessary to save a small number of lives. We have to take those issues on board.
 The hon. Member for Cities of London and Westminster mentioned trusting the courts, but I do not trust the courts. They are too full of people who would have agreed with the hon. Member for Henley when he said the other day that he saw all this as ''sneaking''. That is the public-school mentality, whereby an Englishman's home is his castle. Those who hold that view feel that it is inappropriate to intrude in any way, and that the information should not be provided to the state. I have some sympathy with that view in the normal order of things, but we are not dealing with normal issues. These are matters of life and death, and I very much regret the fact that the Liberals are trying to place another hurdle in the way of obtaining information.

Boris Johnson: Having been provoked several times, I feel that the hon. Gentleman is inciting me to ask him to explain his objection to this extremely sensible Liberal Democrat amendment, which is designed only to link the information to whether someone has recoverable property, and to any offence through which that property was obtained. In a few crisp sentences readily intelligible in Glasgow, Pollok and everywhere else, can he say precisely how the amendment would weaken clause 347? I should be delighted to hear that.

Ian Davidson: My hon. Friend the Minister explained that very well, and it would be inappropriate for me to waste the Committee's time by repeating the arguments. On this issue, I want to be a friend of the Minister and to say that he presented his brief well. My reservation relates to the words ''substantial value'', which appear both in the amendment and the clause. I wonder why that is the hurdle. I would have thought that information discovered often turns out to be of substantial value, but is not always recognised as such when it is being sought. As a result of information discovered, the investigation may take a different route.
 Including the word ''substantial'' creates a higher hurdle than is desirable in public policy terms, given the scale of the issues with which we are dealing. I would be grateful if the Minister would clarify why ''substantial'' is the test and not simply whether something is ''of value''.

Bob Ainsworth: I accept that the powers are intrusive. They will be available only to the director, and the necessary safeguards are adequate. The director should be required to show the judge who issues the order that it is necessary and of substantial value to his investigation, and he should not be allowed to have one if it is not. I am sorry if my hon. Friend feels that that makes me inappropriately soft, but we should have safeguards to prevent such orders from being used too widely and inappropriately. The
 amendment would limit the court's ability to use that discretion, and would place a restriction on the director by making him link the property with the criminal conduct. As I repeatedly said in discussing part 5, he will not always be able to do that.

Norman Baker: This has been an interesting debate, like many in this Committee. I am delighted to have been called moderate, reasonable and cuddly, among other epithets, all of which are absolutely accurate.

Ian Davidson: Innocuous.

Norman Baker: I am sure that the Hansard record will not show that.

Roger Gale: Order. Hansard does not record comments made from a sedentary position.

Ian Davidson: On a point of order, Mr. Gale. Is it in order for you to make such a comment? My understanding is that Hansard will record sedentary interventions if they are responded to, so as the hon. Member for Lewes was sufficiently innocent to respond to the intervention, it will be recorded. If it was not recorded before, the fact that he is innocuous certainly will be on the record now.

Roger Gale: Order. If it were not in order, Mr. Davidson, I would not have said that—which is why the answer to your question is yes.

Norman Baker: There are worse things to be called in this life than innocuous—although I do not accept that particular accusation.
 The hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok is entertaining, as always, but I want to pick up a point that he made in responding to the debate. I resent the suggestion that anyone who draws attention to what may be excessive state power in whatever manifestation is somehow trying to weaken the Bill or being soft on criminals. As he and the Minister said, a balance has to be struck. Most of us are, sensibly, trying to decide where that balance should be. That is what this is about. It does not help to suggest, as does the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok, that anyone who wants to introduce a safeguard is being helpful to criminals or is on the side of collaborators. If the Government had introduced a Bill that provided that people could be arrested without charge, have no access to lawyers and be kept inside for seven days without due process and we wanted to water it down, we would be accused of being on the side of collaborators. That is not a sensible approach.

Nick Hawkins: I agree with the hon. Gentleman. Obviously the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok sometimes has his tongue in his cheek, but there is always an underlying theme—a theme about which I share the views of the hon. Member for Lewes. There have been one or two occasions on which both the hon. Member for Lewes and his colleagues, and my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I, have raised issues that by any standards—even those of the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok, as I am sure he would agree if he studied Hansard—would be recognised as trying to toughen up the Bill. It is perhaps unfortunate that those were all in the week
 that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok was away getting bronzed.

Norman Baker: I do not know about that, but given the Government's thrust, it is more difficult to find ways of toughening up the Bill than of introducing safeguards, which some of us are trying hard to do.

Ian Davidson: Yes, there are ways of toughening up the Bill. It might have been suggested that the word ''substantial'' be deleted. That was a clear opportunity for the Liberal Democrats to toughen up the Bill, but you declined to do so, and instead—

Roger Gale: Order. I did not decline to do anything at all.

Norman Baker: I am glad that you did not, Mr. Gale.
 That would have toughened up the Bill. However, it would also have meant a huge number of extra inquiries about a whole range of innocent people on matters of little value, which would have been a complete waste of time.

Nick Hawkins: Does the hon. Gentleman agree that it would be perfectly possible for the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok, if he were not terrified of the Government Whip, to table his own amendment to do precisely what he is now advocating and delete the word ''substantial''?

Norman Baker: Throughout our debates we have had a number of useful contributions from Labour Committee members. That has been good for democracy. However, there has been a shortage of amendments tabled by them, which is regrettable, as some of them have been very eloquent, albeit careful to couch their points in terms that stay on the right side of the Whip.
 We discussed the point about the Human Rights Act this morning in relation to clause 335. I do not want to return to it in detail—

Roger Gale: Or at all.

Norman Baker: Only in so far as it is relevant to this clause, Mr. Gale.
 It will not do for the Minister to keep saying that if the other provisions do not work, the Human Rights Act is there as a backstop because it requires proportionality. Of course the Human Rights Act is there. However, there is also a requirement for legislation introduced by the House to be consistent with human rights legislation in itself—not for it to be inconsistent and for us to rely on the Act to be used later to make up for any deficiency. The test is not whether another piece of legislation helps, but whether the legislation before us is compatible with the convention. I suggest that it might not be, for the reasons that I spelled out earlier. 
 Incidentally, the Minister did not respond to the point, which is also relevant to this clause, that it is open to a future Government to repeal the Human Rights Act. In that case, all the legislation that is reliant on invoking it at some distant date will be useless; there would not be safeguards in the legislation that had not been repealed. 
 The amendment was very moderate and reasonable—innocuous, even. I do not think that it was cuddly, but it was the other three things. What is wrong with the court having to be satisfied that information is directly connected to determining whether someone is in possession of recoverable property and to any offence through which the property was obtained? It seems entirely reasonable. I have listened carefully to the Minister's objections, and I understand the thrust of his argument. It seems that there is a debate to be had, and I understand his genuine concerns. 
 I am not saying that the amendment is perfect, but equally, the Minister has not said that he understands why I tabled it, nor has he responded to the points raised by Conservative Members in recognition that this is a serious issue. It would have been helpful if he had said, ''I understand that this is a serious issue for the following reasons, but I am not happy with the amendment for these other reasons.'' He has not said that; he has given the impression that there is no issue and that the matter should be swept away. That is a pity. 
 The Minister made one particularly valid point. He was concerned that the amendment would apply to the confiscation investigation—and that was indeed not intended. I am more concerned about the civil recovery investigation element, which was also the concern of the hon. Member for Beaconsfield this morning. For that reason, I shall not press the amendment, but I hope that the Minister will recognise that there is a serious issue concerning how far legislation goes, and how far safeguards have to be introduced. 
 The Minister has not answered my earlier question about other legislation, already on the statute book, that could be invoked to help in such inquiries. I mentioned the Police Act 1997 and the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Law is there to help with investigations of this nature. I do not know whether those who drafted the Bill have cross-checked whether the powers that they seek to introduce are already present in legislation. I suspect that that has not been done, because I have been able to give two examples.

Bob Ainsworth: The disclosure order is available only to the director with regard to criminal confiscation that has been passed on to him by the prosecuting authorities because of the complexity of pursuing the case, and civil recovery. Those powers are unavailable in other circumstances, and no other equivalent powers exist; they are for the director and for those two uses alone.

Norman Baker: I hear what the Minister says, but could not a disclosure order also be used to establish the movements of someone in whom the director was interested? Legislation already exists for establishing someone's movements; the two pieces of legislation to which I referred would allow that to be pursued in the same way, so I do not think that there has been a cross-check of legislation.
 I am sorry that the Minister does not want to accept that that there is any point in the amendment. I am 
 trying to be helpful to him, but he is not being helpful in response.

David Wilshire: I am conscious that the hon. Gentleman is reasonable and straightforward, and is trying to be helpful to the Minister in saying that he does not want to press the amendment to a Division. However, some of us would like to vote, so will he reconsider his niceness and generosity?

Norman Baker: From my point of view, and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Mid-Dorset and North Poole, there is a fine balance between whether to vote or not. I accept that the amendment is not 100 per cent. perfect and that the Minister has a point, but I am disappointed that he has not acknowledged in his responses to myself and to the hon. Member for Surrey Heath that a real issue exists. As the Conservatives want to vote, I will not withdraw the amendment.
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 6, Noes 13.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 347 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 348 - Offences

Question proposed, That the clause stand part of the Bill.

Nick Hawkins: I hope that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok pays attention to what I say, because he will be surprised by it. Have the Government considered toughening up the Bill in respect of the appropriate sentences referred to in this clause? We shall address the matter again, in a corporate context, under clause 355, when the hon. Gentleman may again put pressure on the Minister to be tougher.
 Clause 348 suggests a level 5 fine, which is currently £5,000, and a maximum penalty of six months' imprisonment, which is the normal top of the range for summary offences. The clause suggests two years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine for knowingly or recklessly making a false or misleading statement. 
 In respect of the ''knowingly or recklessly'' offence, which all hon. Members will recognise as the serious end of the scale, have the Government considered a punishment greater than two years' imprisonment? The most serious offences in other criminal justice legislation that I have had a part in debating—not necessarily with this Minister, but with his predecessors—have generally been given a maximum 
 of five years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. I was surprised that the Government went to the top of the scale of summary offences but did not go as high as they might for the knowing or recklessly offence. No doubt, the Minister will explain the thinking and tell us of the discussions that he has had with those who advised him on the matter.

Ian Davidson: I am glad that some of my exhortations are at last bearing fruit, but will the hon. Gentleman tell me why he has not tabled an amendment? The Opposition have tabled amendments that would water down the Bill, but when they claim that they want to toughen it up they simply talk about it.

Nick Hawkins: There are two parts to my answer, the first a technical and the second a tonal point. When my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I examined the Bill, some amendments that we tabled were not selected for debate because they challenged the basis and the substance of the clause. Those amendments were effectively replaced by a stand part debate. I do not know whether we could have drafted an amendment that would not have been automatically swallowed up by a stand part debate. In any case, we chose not to.
 Secondly, the tonal point is that the Government and those who advise them may have some technical reason why they wanted to balance a top of the range level 5 fine for summary offences with only two years' imprisonment and/or an unlimited fine. There may be a reason for that, and we want to hear what the Minister says. 
 If the hon. Gentleman wants to toughen up the Bill, he could have tabled an amendment as a Government Back Bencher. As it is, he has not tabled a single amendment while we have tabled hundreds.

Ian Davidson: I am afeard.

Nick Hawkins: The hon. Gentleman is pointing at the Whip—I can well believe that he is afeard of her. Having established that point in Hansard thanks to his admission against his own interest, I shall give way.

Stephen Hesford: If the hon. Gentleman wants symmetry in the clause, and believes that five years should be given for the more serious offence in subsection (3), should he not logically want a different maximum for the offence in subsection (1)? At the moment, there is symmetry between the summary only offence and two years, which takes a view as to the overall criminality involved. If he had a point, should he not argue that the penalty under subsection (2) should be on indictment two years, raising that maximum as well as the maximum for the more serious offence?

Nick Hawkins: That is another way of analysing the clause, but I analysed it differently. I am used to a tendency in Bills, from not only this Government but my own party when it was in government, to fix a penalty at the top of the summary scale, as this clause does, and then as a balance to fix a penalty of five years for the indictable, more serious offence.
 The hon. Gentleman is a lawyer, and has experience of courts and knows what happens in practice. People rarely receive the maximum penalty prescribed by statute: they tend to get less than the maximum, and if they receive a custodial sentence, the time that they serve in custody is far less than the sentence. There have been many debates between members of different parties about so-called honesty in sentencing. For a long time, my view has been that the great British public would be much happier if they knew that when a judge told someone that he would serve two years in prison, he served that time. A lot of the public probably still believe that the person will serve the time, not that he will come out after two months when he has been sentenced to six months or that, when the Act of Parliament suggests six months maximum, people are given three months and come out after four weeks. 
 The point about honesty in sentencing can be made against Governments of both parties, so it is not politically partisan. It is interesting to consider whether the public are constantly if innocently misled by the terms of legislation and the sentence of the court. I have believed for a long time that it would be far better if courts sentenced for a defined term of imprisonment that was actually served. That was our party's policy at the general election last summer. It was not the Government's policy, and the Government were re-elected, so I accept that we did not prevail in that argument, although I doubt that it affected many people's decision about which way to vote. As a lawyer, the hon. Member for Wirral, West (Stephen Hesford) will understand my concern. 
 In some earlier debates, we talked about what caused some of us to go into public life and seek election to this place. Some time ago, we debated making laws make sense for lawyers and for ordinary members of the public. One factor that motivated me to seek election to Parliament for the first time in 1987, and subsequently to be elected in 1992 and re-elected since, was to try to bring about more honesty in sentencing. I have felt strongly about it for a long time.

Stephen McCabe: I do not know whether we have reached a new stage in the Committee in which the clause under discussion is not supposed to bear any relation to the previous clause, but is it not slightly strange that the hon. Gentleman should argue for tougher penalties for breach of an order that he has spent the best part of the previous hour arguing is draconian, non-specific and likely to lead to fishing trips?

Nick Hawkins: That was an interesting, if completely tongue-in-cheek intervention. Even the Minister's Parliamentary Private Secretary could not keep his face straight, let alone all the other Labour Members. If there were any serious substance to the hon. Gentleman's point, I should say that of course the clauses ought to stand together in any part of the Bill, and that goes for part 8 no less than any other.
 When we consider appropriate sentences, there is an important point that the hon. Member for Wirral, West took seriously, even if the hon. Member for 
 Birmingham, Hall Green (Mr. McCabe) did not. It is that in many pieces of legislation the balance has been six months or level 5 summary only, and five years or unlimited fine on indictment. For some reason that I have not yet heard, because the Minister has not yet responded, the Government and those who advise them have suggested two years. The hon. Member for Birmingham, Hall Green may not realise that we genuinely want to toughen up the provision, but he knows that those who act knowingly or recklessly represent the more serious end of the problem. One has to consider them and say what is appropriate. I think that I have said enough at this stage.

George Foulkes: Hear, hear.

Nick Hawkins: I have been generously taking interventions, so I do not know why the Minister is shouting so loudly. I have been responding to his Back Benchers. We ought to hear the Under-Secretary's justification on whether the more serious, longer-sentence maximum has been established.

Bob Ainsworth: I thought that my hon. Friend was applauding the hon. Gentleman. If he is a believer in honesty in sentencing, perhaps he ought to start with something wholly in his power, which is some more honesty in debating.
 The hon. Gentleman gave two reasons why he did not table an amendment. One was that he did not believe that an amendment was possible. Anyone who looks at the Bill to see whether one could find a different level of penalty and get such an amendment into order will realise that that view cannot be taken seriously. His other reason was, as he said, tonal. The cynic might have something to say about that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Birmingham, Hall Green capably pointed out. We want to introduce appropriate sentences and investigatory powers that actually work and oblige people, where appropriate, to co-operate with the legislation. The hon. Member for Surrey Heath appears to have been proposing for some time now that we should have much less effective investigatory powers, but that to cover any deficiency, or for other reasons, we should increase the sentences. 
 The sentences under the measure are the same as those imposed for non-compliance with disclosure orders issued by the director of the Serious Fraud Office, as set out in the Criminal Justice Act 1987. A disclosure order will not only be aimed at the defendant, but will cover third parties. We think that the two-year imprisonment maximum is about right, so we have not considered raising the penalties. Our intention has been to try to make the investigatory powers effective in the first place.

Nick Hawkins: I think that the Minister slightly caricatured what I said about the difference between a debate on a specific amendment and a clause stand part debate. I think that he knows, in his heart of hearts, whatever he may say in badinage, that it is sometimes better to have a debate on clause stand part, because it deals with the principle without descending to the detail.
 Throughout the Committee's proceedings, the Minister has made a point of saying that some of the 
 existing powers do not work well enough. One of the issues must be whether the sentences for the more serious offences are long enough. I query whether he and his officials have examined that, particularly in relation to the small number of prosecutions. He has repeatedly remarked on that. He has almost treated the issue as a simple arithmetical exercise—there have not been enough prosecutions, so lots of people must be getting away with it. That, however, does not follow at all. Has he considered with his officials how people are currently sentenced? I would like to see a schedule showing the sentences handed down to the small number of people who have been prosecuted.

Bob Ainsworth: The sentences are derived from the Criminal Justice Act 1987. I commend the clause to the Committee.
 Question put and agreed to. 
 Clause 348 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 349 - Statements

Norman Baker: I beg to move amendment No. 553, in page 202, line 16, leave out paragraph (d).
 I refer to the explanatory notes, which recognise that 
As part of the Government's response to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Saunders v. UK, Schedule 3 to the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 amended a number of compulsory disclosure powers in order to prevent a statement obtained under compulsion from a person from being used to incriminate him.
 That is a sensible safeguard, and it is right to include it in the Bill. I tabled this probing amendment because I had been contacted by Liberty, as other Members may have been. The organisation appears to think that this is not a good safeguard. In particular, Liberty takes the view that 
the use of answers in the circumstances contemplated by paragraph (d) would open a defendant up to a risk of being convicted on the basis of forced self-incrimination.
 Liberty says that subsection (2)(d) 
does away with any protections that the rest of clause 349—
 including subsection (1), which is very clear— 
might seek to give to a respondent.
 Liberty also says that, if enacted, the measure 
would expose the Government to a finding of a violation of Article 6(2)
 of the European convention on human rights.

Nick Hawkins: As the hon. Gentleman rightly says, we have also been briefed by Liberty. Because Liberty's briefing was couched in strong terms, I was surprised that he said that his amendment was merely probing, especially given that the Government's own explanatory notes talk about the effects of Saunders v. UK in the European Court of Human Rights. If the Government claim to be dealing with the effects of that important case with their wording, but Liberty does not agree, does that not merit something more serious than a probing amendment?

Norman Baker: It depends on the Minister's response. I am open minded about it, and I hope
 that he will respond to the issue in constructive terms. I do not want to take too long, as I am conscious that there is a guillotine in six minutes and I want him to have a chance to respond.

Bob Ainsworth: Without detracting from the hon. Gentleman's points, I shall try to shorten my reply.
 There is nothing sinister about subsection (2)(d). It will allow for the use of a statement in criminal proceedings if a person makes an statement inconsistent with it while giving evidence in other proceedings. However, subsection (3) also provides that that provision should apply only if the person has raised the issue himself. It will therefore apply when a person or his representative makes a statement or asks a question about something in relation to which he has previously said something else in response to a disclosure order. 
 If a person wants to avoid the information that he gave in relation to the disclosure order being raised, he simply has not to raise it himself. If he does raise it and says something completely different from what he said in response to the disclosure order, it is right that the prosecution should be able to mention the disclosure order. It is, of course, a matter for the court to form a view on the credibility of a witness if he has made two inconsistent statements, even though one was obtained under compulsion. 
 Furthermore, the prosecutor in such proceedings could not bring his case on the basis of the statement. He could adduce the statement as evidence only if the person made an inconsistent statement during evidence. The statement would therefore not be the principal evidence on which the person was incriminated. 
 The amendment would prevent the use of information gained under a disclosure order in other criminal proceedings when there is inconsistency. It would mean that a defendant could make statements to the director about the proceeds of crime in the full knowledge that whatever he said in those proceedings could not be used against him if he made contrary statements in other proceedings. I do not think that that can be right, and I am surprised that the Opposition want to provide what I see as a substantial loophole. 
 I reiterate that if a statement made under compulsion in response to a disclosure order were to be used in another trial, it would be open to the defence to make whatever submissions it deemed appropriate to the court, and the court would have to consider that aspect as part of their other deliberations.

Nick Hawkins: As I pointed out in a brief intervention on the hon. Member for Lewes, the explanatory notes mention the Government's response in Saunders v. UK. Does not the Minister have some concern about the fact that Liberty briefed the hon. Gentleman and the Opposition, saying the Government had got it wrong and that we need that additional safeguard? The amendment to delete paragraph (d) is an important human rights matter.

Bob Ainsworth: I think that I made it clear that I do not. I would find it unacceptable if statements made under coercive powers were usable in other circumstances—without the defendant having effectively contradicted the statement that he made under the disclosure order powers. However, the hon. Gentleman, Liberty and I all making the same argument. We are effectively saying that a person can be obliged to make such a statement and then go to court and completely contradict it, yet still the statement cannot be used to expose that fact. In those circumstances, that would not be a great injustice.

Dominic Grieve: The Minister may remember that we had a similar discussion on an earlier clause. I reminded him then that other confidential communications—for instance, signed statements relating to a person's finances—cannot be used as material for cross-examination in a trial, although they appear to show that the statement being made is inconsistent with the previous one. Giving Saunders v. UK its entire force, I would rather have thought that the statement made under compulsion was exactly that, and that it was completely neutralised as an argument. Indeed, it should be completely neutralised for all other purposes.
 I wonder why the Government think it right to do that, although I understand the point that the Minister is trying to make. It seems somehow to offend against common sense, but it is also rather offensive to normal judicial principles that someone should have to answer those questions under compulsion in the first place.

Bob Ainsworth: I was trying to shorten my answer, in view of the—
 It being Six o'clock, The Chairman proceeded, pursuant to Sessional Order D [30 October 2001] and the Orders of the Committee [13 November 2001 and 22 January 2002], to put forthwith the Question already proposed from the Chair. 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 7, Noes 15.

Question accordingly negatived. 
 Clause 349 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 350 and 351 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 352 - Customer information orders

Amendment proposed: No. 293, in page 203, line 27, leave out 'a senior' and insert 'an'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 352, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 353 to 356 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 357 - Further provisions

Amendment made: No. 294, in page 206, line 36, leave out subsections (1) to (3).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 357, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 358 - Supplementary

Amendments made: No. 296, in page 207, line 16, leave out 'police officer' and insert 'constable'. 
 No. 297, in page 207, line 18, leave out 'police officer' and insert 'constable'. 
 No. 475, in page 207, line 21, at end insert— 
'(6A) An accredited financial investigator, a constable or a customs officer may not make an application for a customer information order or an application to vary such an order unless he is authorised to do so by a senior appropriate officer.'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Clause 358, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 359 - Account monitoring orders

Amendment proposed: No. 298, in page 208, line 10, leave out 'application' and insert 'order'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 359, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 360 and 361 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 362 - Applications

Amendment made: No. 299, in page 209, line 7, leave out subsections (2) to (4).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 362, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 363 - Information: privilege and disclosure

Amendment made: No. 300, in page 209, line 15, leave out subsections (1) to (3).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Motion made, and Question put, That clause 363, as amended, and clauses 364 to 366 stand part of the Bill.
The Committee divided: Ayes 16, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 363, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 364 to 366 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 367 - Production orders

Amendments proposed: No. 526, in page 211, line 15, leave out subsection (3). 
 No. 527, in page 211, line 21, at end insert— 
'(4A ) The application must also state that— 
 (a) the order is sought for the purposes of the investigation; 
 (b) the order is sought in relation to material, or material of a description, specified in the application; 
 (c) a person specified in the application appears to be in possession or control of the material.'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes, 14, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 367, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 368 - Requirements for making of production order

Amendment proposed: No. 528, in page 212, line 3, at end insert— 
'(2A) There must be reasonable grounds for believing that the person the application specifies as appearing to be in possession or control of the material so specified is in possession or control of it.'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 368, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 369 - Order to grant entry

Motion made, and Question put, That the clause stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 369 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Stephen McCabe: On a point of order, Mr. Gale. As it is obvious that my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow, Pollok objects to the fact that the clauses relating specifically to Scotland have not been debated, and that is why he is voting against them, would it be possible to group those clauses together and vote on chapter 3?

Roger Gale: Chairmen group those questions that can properly be grouped, but it is open to hon. Members to object to a Question that is being put and it is then up to the Chair to call a Division. That is because, on some occasions, the official Opposition wish to vote against amendments and clauses. Where I can read properly and with certainty the opinion of the Committee, I will endeavour to call the vote, but if a Member chooses to press a clause or an amendment to a Division, that is his right.

Ian Davidson: Further to that point of order, Mr. Gale. Perhaps it would be helpful if I said that although I intend to oppose everything in this part of the Bill, I would be perfectly happy for all the clauses
 to be grouped to allow more time for debate on subsequent provisions.

Roger Gale: For the convenience of the Committee, and certainly for the convenience of the Chair, I shall call the amendments as they come up, otherwise we shall descend into total confusion. I trust that that will not take a great deal longer. I respect the hon. Gentleman's point of view, and we will accommodate his wishes one way or the other.Clause 370 Further provisions

Clause 370 - Further provisions

Amendments proposed: No. 529, in page 212, line 17, leave out 'may' and insert 'does'. 
 No. 530, in page 212, line 18, after 'privilege' insert— 
', except that a lawyer may be required to produce material containing only the name and address of a client of his.'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Question put, That the amendments be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 6.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Motion made, and Question put, That the clause, as amended, stand part of the Bill:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 14, Noes 1.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 370, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 371 to 373 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 374 - Search warrants

Amendments made: No. 531, in page 214, line 8, leave out subsection (3). 
 No. 532, in page 214, line 27, leave out from beginning to 'may' in line 28 and insert— 
'An application for a search warrant'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Clause 374, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 375 and 376 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 377 - Further provisions: confiscation, civil recovery and money laundering

Amendment proposed: No. 533, in page 216, line 14, leave out 'constable' and insert 'proper person'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 15, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 377, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 378 - Disclosure orders

Amendment made: No. 534, in page 217, line 1, leave out subsection (3).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 378, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 379 to 382 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 383 - Supplementary

Norman Baker: On a point of order, Mr. Gale. Opposition amendments cannot be voted on in this part of the proceedings, but the Minister has expressed his willingness to accept amendment No. 433. I seek clarification on that.

Roger Gale: The Minister has already said that he is minded to accept the amendment. It will therefore by moved formally by the Minister, who is the only person who can move an amendment at this stage.
 Amendments made: No. 433, in page 219, line 7, leave out 'or money laundering investigation'. 
 No. 535, in page 219, line 15, leave out 'or a money laundering investigation'. 
 No. 536, in page 219, line 21, leave out 'the sheriff' and insert— 
'a judge of the court which made the order'.
 No. 537, in page 219, line 25, leave out 'sheriff' and insert 'court'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 383, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 384 - Customer information orders

Amendment made: No. 538, in page 219, line 36, leave out subsection (3).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 384, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 385 to 388 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 389 - Further provisions

Amendment made: No. 539, in page 223, line 2, leave out subsection (1).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 389, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 390 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 391 - Account monitoring orders

Amendments made: No. 540, in page 223, line 34, leave out subsection (3). 
 No. 541, in page 224, line 18, leave out 'application' and insert 'order'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 391, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 392 and 393 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 394 - Further provisions

Amendment made: No. 542, in page 225, line 13, leave out subsection (1).—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 394, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 395 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 396 - Jurisdiction of sheriff

Amendment made: No. 543, in page 226, line 6, at end insert— 
'or to any other provision of this Act'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Clause 396, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 397 - Interpretation

Amendment proposed: No. 544, in page 226, leave out lines 16 to 24 and insert— 
' ''legal privilege'' means protection in legal proceedings from disclosure, by virtue of any rule of law relating to the confidentiality of communications; and ''items subject to legal privilege'' are—communications between a professional legal adviser and his client, or communications made in connection with or in contemplation of legal proceedings and for the purposes of those proceedings, which would be so protected.'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 15, Noes 7.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 397, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 398 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 399 - Property

Amendment proposed: No. 545, in page 227, line 24, leave out 
'but excluding a lease which is not a long lease'.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Question put, That the amendment be made:—
The Committee divided: Ayes 17, Noes 5.

Question accordingly agreed to. 
 Clause 399, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 400 and 401 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 402 - Modifications of the 1986 Act

Bob Ainsworth: I beg to move amendment No. 563, in page 229, line 10, leave out from 'which' to end of line 11 and insert—
'an order under section 50 or 52 is in force;'.

Roger Gale: With this it will convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 564 to 592, 595, 596, 598, 599 and 601.

Bob Ainsworth: The amendments are highly technical, although the issue that they address is
 relatively straightforward. As drafted, part 9 provides that if a restraint order is made or a receiver is appointed under the confiscation legislation before a bankruptcy order is made under the insolvency legislation, confiscation takes precedence and the property that is affected does not form part of the bankrupt's estate. However, we recently discovered that those arrangements are flawed because a bankrupt's estate is assessed at the time when the bankruptcy order is made. When property is excluded from the bankrupt's estate, there is no way of putting it into the estate if it ceases to be excluded after that date.
 Under those circumstances, the restrained property would be returned to its owner. It would not form part of the bankrupt's estate because it did not do so when the bankruptcy order was made. The result would be that the creditors would lose out. The amendments will rectify that situation.

David Wilshire: After I said that I appreciated that we have more time, it is a shame that we had to curtail our debate on a wide range of measures—I do not believe that anyone was wasting time—in order to move on to a new part. Although there are 32 amendments in the group, I suspect that we will have more time than we need on them. I flag that up, although I understand that I am probably out of order.
 I worked my way through all 32 amendments, and I appreciate that some are repetitive and do the same thing to subsequent clauses. It seems like several years ago, but I suspect that it was only last November that I made the point that every amendment must be justified. That is not an argument for the Minister to stand up and work his way through 32 amendments, but I would be grateful if he would flesh out his comment that they are technical. What are the technicalities? As I said, I am not asking him to explain 32 times, but a bit more information than we have been given would be helpful. 
 Having made that general point, I wish to turn my attention to amendment No. 567, which is lurking in the group of 32. If I understand it correctly, it proposes that the bankruptcy proceedings would deal with what is left over after everything else has been dealt with. Essentially, the group of amendments define the property concerned, and amendment No. 567 proposes adding in what is left over after confiscation proceedings. It raises a serious point, which the Minister must address; I look forward to hearing his response. I am sure that the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok will be relieved to know—[Interruption.]

Roger Gale: Order. I must remind members of the Committee that if they wish to engage in private conversations, they should do so outside the Room. I wish to hear what is said by the speaker who has the Floor.

David Wilshire: Thank you, Mr. Gale.
 As I was saying, the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok will be relieved to know that I am not arguing in favour of making bankruptcy a loophole. I readily accept that the principle of the legislation is absolutely right: we must ensure that bankruptcy cannot be used 
 as a way of diverting funds. It has been and can be done; it is an attractive loophole at present. 
 However, I am worried about taking the principle too far. Genuine bankruptcy proceedings against someone with a great amount of ill-gotten gain will not be a ruse to divert money. The person will lose the proceeds of crime as a result, and the effect will be what the Bill is trying to achieve. The money is taken away via the bankruptcy route, which is different from the proceeds of crime route, but the effect on the person would be the same and the objectives of the legislation would be achieved. 
 I am concerned about genuine bankruptcies. As I understand it, laundered money often finds its way into legitimate businesses, and innocent people trade with such businesses in good faith. A person who is running a legitimate business, albeit on the proceeds of crime, may genuinely go bankrupt. If we say that in such a situation the proceeds of crime procedures will take precedence over the bankruptcy procedures, the creditor who in good faith engaged in business with the legitimate business would be hit by the legislation. That concerns me. 
 As it stands, the legislation says that bankruptcy proceedings against someone who is running a legitimate business on laundered money must follow the proceeds of crime procedures. Amendment No. 567 clearly states that the courts can revert to bankruptcy proceedings with the money that is left over. My concerns are that there will be a delay—it could be a considerable delay—before the proceeds of crime procedures are completed and, when they are, there may not be much money left over. Often, the innocent are hurt most in bankruptcy proceedings. 
 Therefore, I have concerns about the bankruptcy proceedings, with regard to a legitimate business that is run with the proceeds of crime. Those proceedings might take two or three years: the business might have many creditors who are not involved in any illegal activity, and who can have had no knowledge of what was going on, because they were doing business with a perfectly legitimate organisation. They might be asked to wait for three or four years. Who knows how long such proceedings could take? During that period, they might go bankrupt, because, for instance, they are unable carry on their business. That cannot be right. 
 The proceedings might not take two or three years, but problems might arise even if it is a quick process. For instance, it would not be right if someone were to discover that they were owed £100,000 by a business that they thought was legitimate and, through no fault of their own, although the legitimate part of that business had £100,000 of assets that could have been paid to them, another procedure takes that money away from them, even though they are entirely innocent. Under normal circumstances, the creditor would have received that money and could continue in business, but if that money were taken away because of this legislation, an innocent person could go bankrupt. 
 I am sure that that is not the Minister's intention. I presume that his intention is to ensure that it is impossible for bankruptcy to be used as a loophole, 
 and I support that goal. However, it is possible for a bankruptcy that is not being used as a loophole to take place. Therefore, I ask the Minister to examine whether it would be possible to table an extra amendment—which could be added to the existing 32—that would draw a distinction between the person who is involved in crime and who tries to make money disappear via a concocted bankruptcy and an innocent creditor who is legitimately and unwittingly trading with someone who is involved in crime. Such a creditor should not be prosecuted, or caught up in the matter. 
 I am sure that the Minister does not want innocent people to be caught up in a damaging way in such a situation. I hope that the Minister can say to us that a distinction can be drawn between somebody who uses the bankruptcy route as a loophole and someone who goes bankrupt for genuine reasons. We must provide safeguards to protect the innocent.

Nick Hawkins: Although I want to focus on other issues, I wish to express my agreement with everything that my hon. Friend has said. It is unnecessary for me to go over that ground again, as he has covered it so ably, and I look forward to hearing the Minister's response.
 I am surprised that there are so many amendments to one part of the Bill. It is extraordinary that it should need to be so substantially rewritten. The legislation is complex. My hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield and I have occasionally remarked that it is too complex, and that it will be difficult to operate it at the sharp end. I hope that the Minister can explain why the Government needed to do so much rewriting. As there has already been a draft Bill, it must be an embarrassment to the Government that such an enormous amount of rewriting needs to be done. That is a general point. 
 I turn to a more detailed point with regard to Government amendment No. 593. I notice that it is in the name, not of all the Ministers—or the Ministers and the Whip—as some of them have been, but only of the Minister of State, Scotland Office. In these days of devolution, and with so many hon. Members representing Scottish constituencies in the United Kingdom Parliament, it is ironic that a Scottish Minister should reintroduce a reference to legislation that predates the Act of Union. 
 I am always delighted when reference is made to Acts of Parliament that were written in the days that are almost—although, happily, not completely—beyond recall. Legislation was simple in those days. It is a pleasure to see it being used again.

Roger Gale: Order. To which amendment is the hon. Gentleman referring?

Nick Hawkins: No. 593.

Roger Gale: In that case, the hon. Gentleman is out of order. Amendment No. 593 belongs to another group of amendments.

Nick Hawkins: I am sorry.

Bob Ainsworth: Forgive me, Mr. Gale, I was not trying to deflect from the importance of the provisions. It is just that we have so little time in which to discuss part 9. The Opposition have not tabled amendments to the other clauses, but there may have been clauses that they wanted light on as we moved through this part of the Bill. I flagged up that issue to the hon. Member for Beaconsfield to make him aware of the amendments and their broad intent. I shall first explain their purpose.
 Part 9 deals with when the same property could be affected simultaneously by confiscation and insolvency proceedings. It makes it clear when confiscation proceedings take precedent and when insolvency proceedings take precedent. Among other things, it helps to avoid the uncertainties that may arise if two receivers—one confiscation and one insolvency—were simultaneously in post at the same time. 
 We have discovered that the arrangements are flawed. The hon. Gentleman said he was surprised that so many amendments were tabled. He will see that this part of the Bill is repetitive. Therefore, one change would lead inevitably to a multiplicity of amendments. We are dealing with circumstances in which property is excluded from a bankrupt's estate and there is no way of putting it into the bankrupt's estate if it ceases to be excluded at a later date. 
 For the benefit of the hon. Member for Spelthorne, I shall cite a couple of examples of the problem. If a restraint order were made in confiscation proceedings, the property concerned would not form part of the bankrupt's estate. A bankruptcy order might be made while the restraint order was still in force. The restraint order would then be discharged because the defendant had been acquitted or for some other reason. Under those circumstances, the restrained property would be returned to its owner. It would not form part of the bankrupt's estate, because it did not do so when the bankruptcy order was made. The result is that the creditors would have lost out. We would have bypassed them and handed the money back to the original owner, thus rendering the bankruptcy proceedings useless in respect of the property that was subject to the confiscation or restraint order. 
 Another example of the same problem is when a person is convicted and a confiscation order is made. A receiver is appointed before a bankruptcy order is made, so that confiscation has the first call on the property. A bankruptcy order is made. If the receiver has spare property left over after the confiscation order has been fully enforced, once again it is excluded from the bankrupt's estate and must be returned to the owner, not the creditors. I do not believe that Conservative Members would want that to happen. To prevent such action and rectify the flaw, three separate sets of amendments are needed to the Bill because of it repetitive nature. We have also taken the opportunity under the amendments to remove some unnecessary duplication from the clauses. I am sorry that there are so many of them, but that is inevitable because of the Bill's structure.

David Wilshire: I fully support the Minister's points. I hope that I made it clear that I was not trying to water the measures down. I was concerned not about whether there was a technicality, but about the delay in getting the money into the bankrupt's estate and ensuring that it is there for genuine creditors.

Bob Ainsworth: The delay will not always be avoidable. Obviously, it will be unwelcome, but the moneys will be under restraint and the procedure must take its course. The important thing is that, if the restraint order fails, the creditors are treated appropriately and we have not circumvented the bankruptcy order. Any delay is regrettable, but I do not see how it could be avoided in all circumstances.

David Wilshire: My argument is that the Minister should find a way to ensure that a delay does not occur. Whether the money goes to the creditor or the Crown, on the basis of the Bill the person who had the money as the proceeds of crime has lost it. Does the Minister agree that it does not matter in which direction the money goes? It matters only to the creditor, and a delay is unacceptable.

Bob Ainsworth: Which way the money goes seriously matters. If bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings start and the restraint is already in place and that restraint subsequently fails, it would be wholly inappropriate if the money were then passed back to the original owner and creditors were deprived of what was rightfully theirs. The hon. Gentleman says that we should find a way of ensuring that there cannot be any delay, but I am not sure to what extent we could speed up, without prejudicing justice, the operation of the restraint and confiscation procedures. One would want those to be as quick as reasonable, but they cannot be waved away.

Mark Field: I have a lot of sympathy with the situation in which the Minister finds himself. During my brief and less than glorious legal career, I had some experience of insolvency. One great difficulty facing the Government is that there will be an inevitable rush with the confiscation order, which could roughly coincide with insolvency being called and the receiver being brought in. Nothing would be more unjust than the sheer coincidence of one event happening before the other and a matter of two or three days making a profound difference to the position of creditors. At this stage and perhaps later, there will be a need to think through all implications and ensure that there are more amendments to make this right.
 My hon. Friend the Member for Spelthorne made an important point. The interests of innocent third parties should first and foremost be looked after as much as possible. I appreciate the Minister's comments on time delays. Once the matters are in the hands of a receiver, it is extremely difficult for the court to jolly the pace along, as we are seeing with Railtrack at the moment. I hope that he will give some thought to that.

Bob Ainsworth: You must be tired after your earlier activities, Mr. Gale. I have never known anyone else get away with an intervention of that length.
 The amendments are the only way in which we will be able to avoid creating a massive loophole. If we give precedence to insolvency proceedings over restraint, we will end up with sham insolvencies to prevent confiscation. I do not see how we can structure the Bill any differently and still prevent that loophole. We want the measures to operate as quickly as possible and we do not want unnecessary delays, but they will be inevitable on occasion. The amendments will ensure that, if the restraint order is not successful at the end of the day, the money will go to the appropriate place and not necessarily back to the original owner. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendments made: No. 564, in page 229, leave out lines 12 to 14. 
 No. 565, in page 229, line 18, leave out from 'which' to end of line 19 and insert— 
'an order under section 201 or 203 is in force;'.
 No. 566, in page 229, leave out lines 20 to 22.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 402, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 403 - Restriction of powers

Amendment made: No. 567, in page 230, line 8, at end insert— 
'(d) in a case where a confiscation order has been made under section 6 or 158 of this Act, any sums remaining in the hands of a receiver appointed under section 50, 52, 201 or 203 of this Act after the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order has been fully paid; 
 (e) in a case where a confiscation order has been made under section 94 of this Act, any sums remaining in the hands of an administrator appointed under section 129 of this Act after the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order has been fully paid.'—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Clause 403, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 404 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 405 - Modifications of the 1985 Act

Amendments made: No. 568, in page 231, line 27, leave out from 'which' to end of line 28 and insert— 
'an order under section 50 or 52 is in force;'.
 No. 569, in page 231, leave out lines 29 to 31. 
 No. 592, in page 231, leave out lines 32 to 34 and insert— 
'(d) any property in respect of which an order is in force under section 129(3)'
 No. 570, in page 231, line 35, leave out from 'which' to end of line 36 and insert— 
'an order under section 201 or 203 is in force;'.
 No. 571, in page 231, leave out lines 37 to 39.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 405, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 406 - Restriction of powers

Amendment made: No. 572, in page 232, line 24, at end insert— 
'(d) in a case where a confiscation order has been made under section 6 or 158 of this Act, any sums remaining in the hands of a receiver appointed under section 50, 52, 201 or 203 of this Act after the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order has been fully paid; 
 (e) in a case where a confiscation order has been made under section 94 of this Act, any sums remaining in the hands of an administrator appointed under section 129 of this Act after the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order has been fully paid.'—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Clause 406, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 407 - Tainted gifts

George Foulkes: I beg to move amendment No. 593, in page 232, line 42, after 'under' insert
'the Bankruptcy Act 1621 (c. 18) or'

Roger Gale: With this it will be convenient to take Government amendments Nos. 594 and 597.

George Foulkes: This is the ancient matter to which the hon. Member for Surrey Heath referred. The Bankruptcy (Scotland) Act 1985 repealed the Bankruptcy Act 1621, but there remains the possibility of a challenge under the 1621 Act in relation to transactions entered into before 1 April 1986. Similarly, there is always the possibility of a challenge at common law to a gift by an insolvent donor on the grounds that the gift amounts to a fraud on his creditors.
 Amendments Nos. 593 and 594 are designed to ensure that, if a person whose estate has been sequestrated makes a tainted gift that is subject to action under the confiscation legislation, no creditor can obtain a court decree to make the tainted gift part of the debtor's estate. Amendment No. 597 makes similar provision with regard to tainted gifts made by a company that is being wound up under the Insolvency Act 1986. 
 I am grateful to have an opportunity to speak about an amendment that relates to Scotland. I dare say that I would have had many more such opportunities if there had been less badinage about the all-party rugby group and other ridiculous interventions.

Roger Gale: I said earlier that I intended to suspend the sitting at 7 o'clock, but it is no part of the Chair's business to seek to curtail debate, nor is it in the interests of the House for legislation to go through unnecessarily undebated. I am conscious that dealing formally with a considerable number of amendments has taken up a lot of time that hon. Members would have wished to use for debate. I shall therefore be as lenient as reasonably possible now, given the kind understanding of the Officers of the House.

Nick Hawkins: I can be brief. I remind the Minister that the discussion about the all-party rugby group was started not by an Opposition Member, but by the hon. Member for Glasgow, Pollok. He sought
 support, to which I was happy to respond.

Roger Gale: Order. The Chair's leniency stops short of badinage.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful for that ruling, Mr. Gale, particularly at 6.59 pm.
 May I simply adopt what I said mistakenly earlier? The group of 32 amendments under clause 402 was so huge that I misread them, and in fact amendment No. 593 was one of the few that were not in that group. Rather than repeat anything, I shall adopt what I said then. It is a delicious irony for a pre-Act of Union piece of legislation to be invoked by a Scottish Minister of a post-devolution Government. 
 The Minister expertly read out his speech, as always. It is peculiar that we are discussing things that might arise under an Act that was passed as long ago as even 1986.

Dominic Grieve: Does my hon. Friend agree that it would be nice if the Minister read out the relevant portions of the 1621 Act to allow us to understand whether they are in intelligible English?

Nick Hawkins: I am sure that they will be in either Jacobean or Caroline English, which may or may not be easy to understand. However, we can be confident that any Act of Parliament of 1621 would be shorter and more effective than many pieces of longer and more complex legislation.

George Foulkes: Let me point out to the hon. Gentleman that he is havering—I am not referring to a London borough. I hoped that I had made my explanation in perfect English, although if he wanted to hear it in any other language, I would be happy. When I made my earlier remark about badinage, the reason why I looked directly at him was that I do not have eyes in the back of my head. If I did, I would have looked at the other person to whom I referred.

Nick Hawkins: I am grateful for that illuminating intervention. I refute the charge that I am havering, because I thought that the word—in English or Scottish—referred to jostling between two positions and not making up one's mind. I am clear that Government amendment No. 593 is good. I do not oppose it, and nor am I havering. I simply wanted to make some observations. [Interruption.]

Roger Gale: Order. I am not sure whether the hon. Gentleman is havering, but there is a lot of chirruping going on.

Nick Hawkins: I will leave the matter there, although it is unfortunate that the Minister did not respond to the invitation by my hon. Friend the Member for Beaconsfield to go through the Bankruptcy Act 1621.
 In the past, I have suggested that if I am ever lucky enough to win a high place in the private Member's Bill ballot, I will introduce an automatic repeal of legislation Bill, saying that for every page of statute law a Government introduce, they must find at least one page—and preferably more—to repeal. The fact that the Bankruptcy Act 1621 is still referred to in 2002 and is brought back into legislation by a Government 
 amendment suggests that it alone is relevant among thousands of pages of otherwise useless and outmoded legislation.

Stephen McCabe: Will the hon. Gentleman follow that principle and consider whether for every contribution that he makes in Committee, he could reflect on irrelevant contributions that waste time, and find out whether he could save on those?

Nick Hawkins: That could be described as an oxymoronic intervention, because it wasted more time.
 I have said enough, although I am pleased that a piece of legislation from 1621 is still thought to be important.

George Foulkes: The Bankruptcy Act 1621 is, of course, only a short title for the1621 Act of
alienations to any conjunct or confident person on the basis that it is without true, just and necessary causes and without a just price duly paid, the same being done after the contracting of lawful debts from two creditors.
 I hope that that convinces the Committee. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Amendment made: No. 594, in page 232, line 43, after 'preferences)' insert ', or otherwise,'—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 407, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 408 - Modifications of the 1989 Order

Amendments made: No. 573, in page 233, line 42, leave out from 'which' to end of line 43 and insert— 
'an order under section 50 or 52 is in force;'.
 No. 574, in page 234, leave out lines 1 to 3. 
 No. 595, in page 234, leave out lines 4 to 6 and insert— 
'(d) any property in respect of which an order is in force under section 129(3)'
 No. 575, in page 234, line 7, leave out from 'which' to end of line 8 and insert— 
'an order under section 201 or 203 is in force;'.
 No. 576, in page 234, leave out lines 9 to 11.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 408, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 409 - Restriction of powers

Amendment made: No. 577, in page 234, line 40, at end insert— 
'(d) in a case where a confiscation order has been made under section 6 or 158 of this Act, any sums remaining in the hands of a receiver appointed under section 50, 52, 201 or 203 of this Act after the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order has been fully paid; 
 (e) in a case where a confiscation order has been made under section 94 of this Act, any sums remaining in the hands of an administrator appointed under section 129 of this Act after the amount required to be paid under the confiscation order has been fully paid.'—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.]
 Clause 409, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 410 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 411 - Winding up under the 1986 Act

Amendments made: No. 578, in page 236, line 20, leave out from 'which' to end of line 21 and insert— 
'an order under section 50 or 52 is in force;'.
 No. 579, in page 236, leave out lines 22 to 24. 
 No. 596, in page 236, leave out lines 25 to 27 and insert— 
'(d) any property in respect of which an order is in force under section 129(3)'
 No. 580, in page 236, line 28, leave out from 'which' to end of line 29 and insert— 
'an order under section 201 or 203 is in force;'.
 No. 581, in page 236, leave out lines 30 to 32.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 411, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 412 - Tainted gifts

Amendment made: No. 597, in page 237, line 43, after 'alienations)' insert ', or otherwise.'—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 412, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 413 - Winding up under the 1989 Order

Amendments made: No. 582, in page 238, line 36, leave out from 'which' to end of line 37 and insert— 
'an order under section 50 or 52 is in force;'.
 No. 583, in page 238, leave out lines 38 to 40. 
 No. 598, in page 238, leave out lines 41 to 43 and insert— 
'(d) any property in respect of which an order is in force under section 129(3)'
 No. 584, in page 238, line 44, leave out from 'which' to end of line 45 and insert— 
'an order under section 201 or 203 is in force;'.
 No. 585, in page 239, leave out lines 1 to 3.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 413, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 414 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 415 - Floating charges

Amendments made: No. 586, in page 240, line 40, leave out from 'which' to end of line 41 and insert— 
'an order under section 50 or 52 is in force;'.
 No. 587, in page 240, leave out lines 42 to 44. 
 No. 599, in page 241, leave out lines 1 to 3 and insert— 
'(d) any property in respect of which an order is in force under section 129(3)'
 No. 588, in page 241, line 4, leave out from 'which' to end of line 5 and insert— 
'an order under section 201 or 203 is in force;'.
 No. 589, in page 241, leave out lines 6 to 8.—[Mr. Bob Ainsworth.] 
 Clause 415, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clauses 416 and 417 ordered to stand part of the Bill.

Clause 418 - Meaning of insolvency practitioner

Mr. Ainsworth rose—

George Foulkes: I beg to move amendment No. 600, in page 243, line 29, after 'receiver' insert—
'or the Accountant in Bankruptcy'

Nick Hawkins: Which Minister is the ventriloquist and which is the dummy?

George Foulkes: I do not think that you are quite as old as me, Mr. Gale, but you may remember Peter Brough and Archie Andrews.

Roger Gale: I do not remember them, but I have heard of them.

George Foulkes: Hon. Members should find out what Archie Andrews looks like, and then look at the hon. Member for Surrey Heath. They will see a remarkable resemblance.
 Clause 418 defines what is meant by the term ''insolvency practitioner''. Subsection (4)(b) makes reference to section 388(5) of the Insolvency Act 1986 and its reference to the official receiver. That subsection of the 1986 Act also refers to the Scottish equivalent of the official receiver, the accountant in bankruptcy, and amendment No. 600 is designed to make that clear. 
 Amendment agreed to. 
 Clause 418, as amended, ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Clause 419 ordered to stand part of the Bill. 
 Further consideration adjourned.—[Mrs. McGuire.] 
 Adjourned accordingly at nine minutes past Seven o'clock till Thursday 31 January at quarter-past Nine o'clock.